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We employ a unique data set containing bank-specific information to explore how foreign bank 
entry determines credit allocation in emerging markets. We investigate the impact of the mode 
of foreign entry (greenfield or takeover) on banks’ portfolio allocation to borrowers with 
different degrees of informational transparency, as well as by maturities and currencies. The 
impact of foreign entry on credit allocation may stem from the superior performance of foreign 
entrants (“performance hypothesis”), or reflect borrower informational capture (“portfolio 
composition hypothesis”). Our results are broadly in line with the portfolio composition 
hypothesis, showing that borrower informational capture determines bank credit allocation.  
JEL Classification Numbers: G21, G28, G34, L11 
Keywords:  banks, ownership, credit allocation 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Credit allocation is an important determinant of economic growth (see e.g., Levine, 2005). 
Recent theories predict considerable impacts of different modes of foreign bank entry on 
credit allocation. Foreign banks may overcome cross-border informational disadvantages 
when they are efficiently managed and have a superior performance (the “performance 
hypothesis”; see Berger and others, 2000). Foreign banks then extend loans to all borrower 
types, and charge lower lending rates than domestic banks (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004; 
Claeys and Hainz, 2007). Foreign banks however are often accused of “cherry picking” the 
best borrowers, and in general, of lending more to large transparent firms at the expense of 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), implying a different portfolio composition (the 
“portfolio composition” hypothesis; see e.g., Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004; Sengupta, 
2007; Claeys and Hainz, 2007; Gormley, 2007a; Detragiache and others, 2008). Also, foreign 
banks could have only short-term objectives in their ost countries, making them less likely 
to extend long-term loans (Rodrik and Velasco, 1999). Finally, foreign banks may increase 
the supply of loans in foreign currency, which can be detrimental to the financial stability of 
the host country if the borrowers do not hedge this currency risk (Sorsa and others, 2007).  
 
While there is a growing number of empirical studies analyzing lending to borrowers by 
foreign banks (see e.g., Berger and others, 2001; Clarke et. al., 2005; Clarke and others, 
2006; Gormley, 2007b; Giannetti and Ongena, 2008, 209; Bruno and Hauswald, 2009), up 
to now, no comprehensive investigation of all dimensio s of banks’ credit allocation was 
possible due to lack of detailed data. Our unique data set containing bank-specific 
information on several dimensions of credit allocation allows for a detailed investigation of 
the theoretical predictions of foreign bank entry on credit allocation.  
 
We study the impact of different modes of foreign bank entry (greenfield and takeover) on 
the supply of loans to transparent and opaque borrowe s, as well as the impact on loan 
maturity, currency, and loan rates for these groups of borrowers. We also investigate the 
impacts of foreign bank entry on the portfolio composition and risks of domestic banks. We 
differentiate between greenfield banks (foreign banks that enter via greenfield investment) 
and takeover banks (foreign banks that acquire an existing domestic institution), because 
theory suggests that the impacts of foreign banks’ behavior depends on their mode of entry 
(see e.g., Claeys and Hainz, 2007). Takeover banks for example may encounter difficulties 
when trying to improve credit standards or risk management procedures, as the acquired 
institutions are burdened by nonperforming loans and non-transparent organizational 
structure. Greenfield banks, while free of such concer s, are disadvantaged in their access to 
borrower information, whereas takeover banks possess r lationships with incumbent firms 
they inherit from the acquired bank.  
 
An appropriate test of the impacts of different modes of foreign bank entry on credit 
allocation requires the presence of both an important fraction of foreign entrants and of 
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domestic banks. Our unique detailed data set on the Polish banking industry fulfills this 
requirement, as currently the share of foreign investors in Polish banks amounts to 
74 percent, and banks of all types of ownership and mo e of entry are represented. The data 
set provides us with quarterly information on the portfolio composition of all Polish banks 
regarding different groups of borrowers, loan maturity, currency, and loan rates for the period 
1996–2006. We believe that our paper is the first to study all dimensions of banks’ credit 
allocation in a comprehensive way.  
 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we show that greenfield banks devote a 
higher share of their portfolios to transparent borrowers, lend more at shorter maturity and in 
foreign currency. Second, there is a significant convergence between foreign and domestic 
banks in terms of groups of borrowers they lend to, while there is no convergence in terms of 
maturity and currency, possibly stemming from foreign banks’ refinancing possibilities.1 
Third, we show that both modes of foreign bank entry had a detrimental impact on the loan 
portfolio quality of domestic banks. Finally, our findings support the “portfolio composition” 
hypothesis, and thus contradict studies that argue that greenfield banks charge lower lending 
rates than domestic private banks due to their superior performance only. Previous results in 
the literature could stem from the fact that greenfield banks have a higher share of the most 
transparent borrowers in their portfolio, whose cost f credit is lower than that of opaque 
borrowers. Moreover, earlier studies argue that there is a convergence of interest rates 
between banks of different types of ownership, whereas we show that this effect can be 
attributed to portfolio composition, as, with time, greenfield banks start lending less to 
transparent borrowers. 
 
The effect of bank ownership on the cost of credit for different types of borrowers is an 
important question, since lending rates might be prohibitive for some borrowers, damaging 
economic growth. For example, Calvo and Coricelli (1993) argue that the credit contraction 
in Central and Eastern Europe explains partly the heavy decline in output in this region 
during the period 1989–90. Therefore, lower interest ates of foreign banks might speak in 
favor of removing entry barriers for foreign banks. However, it is important to examine 
whether foreign banks charge lower lending rates to all borrowers, or only to large 
transparent firms at the expense of opaque SMEs which may continue to suffer from the 
informational capture of incumbent banks. In most countries SMEs account for the majority 
of firms in the economy and a significant share of employment (Hallberg, 2001, Ayyagari 
and others, 2007), hence their access to financing has important implications for the level of 
economic development and growth. The existing empirical evidence shows that lending rates 
of foreign banks in developing countries are lower than those of domestic banks. This is 
particularly true for greenfield banks which are not burdened with nonperforming loans and 
                                                
1 These results are obtained using different methodologies such as looking at different subperiods or using bank 
age. 
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inefficient organizational structures (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004; Claeys and Hainz, 
2007). We show that this empirical finding may stem from a portfolio composition effect in 
that foreign banks serve more transparent borrowers. Our findings are in line with 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) and Sengupta (2007)’s theoretical models. Dell’Ariccia 
and Marquez (2004) argue that foreign banks have adantages in targeting more transparent 
new clients (transactions-based lending), whereas domestic banks are better placed to lend to 
firms based on soft information (relationship lending). Sengupta (2007) shows that foreign 
entrants may exploit their cost-advantage by offering collateralized loans to large transparent 
firms whereas incumbent banks retain more risky borrowers. Such market segmentation 
could lead to reduced access to finance of firms relying on domestic lenders (Gormley, 
2007b). Giannetti and Ongena (2008) show however that all firms benefit from foreign entry 
as indirect effects outweigh.2  
 
The portfolio composition effect can additionally manifest itself in other dimensions of credit 
allocation such as collateral requirements (Sengupta, 2007), and the maturity and currency 
denomination of loans. In recent years, loans in foreign currencies gained popularity in some 
emerging economies due to their perceived lower costs (Brown and others, 2008). Indeed, 
loan rates in domestic currencies have been higher than the ones in foreign currencies in most 
transition economies, and borrowers—willing to take on foreign exchange and interest rate 
risks—preferred to take loans denominated in foreign currencies. In some countries 
appreciation of the domestic currency made loans in foreign currency appear even cheaper. 
Foreign banks also supplied more easily foreign currency loans, since they have better access 
to international capital markets and to financing from their parent institutions. Further, 
foreign bank lending may involve more short-term loans to solve asymmetric information 
problems as wells as “hot” money that is readily retracted during crises.3 We therefore also 
study how the mode of foreign bank entry impacts the maturity and currency denomination 
of loans, as well as the impact of maturity and currency denomination on the lending rate. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical predictions 
and empirical evidence. Readers who are interested in our results only, can directly go to 
Section 3 where we present our data and summary statistics. Sections 4 and 5 describe our 
empirical findings on portfolio allocation and loan rates, respectively. Section 6 deals with 




                                                
2 There is also some empirical evidence showing thatforeign-owned banks are less likely to lend to 
informationally opaque small businesses than domestically-owned banks (Berger and others, 2001; Clarke nd 
others, 2006, Gormley, 2007b, Mian, 2006).   
3 For example, Dooley and Shin (2000) argue that foreign creditors’ run from Korean banks triggered the crisis 
in Korea in 1997. 
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II.  L ITERATURE REVIEW : THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
 
A.   Theory 
 
Theory predicts different impacts of foreign bank etry on credit allocation. We start with the 
impacts on banks’ portfolio allocation and loan rates to transparent and opaque 
borrowers. Berger and others (2000) formulates the global advantage hypothesis, according 
to which efficiently managed foreign institutions are able to overcome cross-border 
disadvantages (distance, monitoring costs, differences in institutional environment, language 
and culture) and operate more efficiently than their domestic competitors. Foreign banks may 
have higher efficiency when operating in other nations as they are able to spread their 
superior managerial skills or best-practice policies and procedures over more resources, thus 
lowering costs.4 We label this the “performance hypothesis”. The “performance” effect is 
expected to be identical for all borrowers when foreign entrants pass on the efficiency gains 
in a similar fashion to both transparent and opaque borrowers.5 The performance hypothesis 
should be strongest for foreign banks entering transition economies that have nascent 
banking markets characterized by low competition and efficiency, and for greenfield banks 
relative to takeover banks as the first type did not inherit bad loans and inefficient 
organizational structures. Takeover banks in contrast need transitional time in order to 
modernize their lending practices and to clean up the loan portfolio which is left from 
previous owners.  
 
An alternative hypothesis explaining banks’ choices of clients can be labeled the “portfolio 
composition hypothesis”. Several theoretical papers argue that foreign banks have a 
comparative advantage in lending based on hard information, i.e., in lending to large 
transparent firms that have a long credit history and detailed financial statement information 
(Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004; Gormley, 2007a; Gormley, 2007b; Sengupta, 2007; 
Detragiache and others, 2008). Moreover, foreign baks are better suited to lend to 
multinational corporations from their home countries. In contrast, domestic banks use 
“relationship lending” to gain knowledge about opaque firms that can produce less hard 
                                                
4 Foreign entrants may also raise revenues through sperior investment or risk management skills, by providing 
better service quality/variety that some customers prefer, or by obtaining diversification of risks tha  allows 
them to undertake higher risk-higher expected return investments. Further, foreign banks in transition and 
developing economies additionally benefit from their better access to international capital markets and fu ding 
from their parent companies. This diminishes their cost of funds, which in turn should be translated into lower 
lending rates, benefiting borrowers. Moreover, foreign banks might enjoy lower cost of deposits due to their 
superior reputation. 
5The following empirical papers show that foreign banks exhibit indeed higher efficiency (Bonin and others, 
2005; Weill, 2003), experience faster and more stable loan growth (De Haas and Lelyveld, 2006), and enjoy 
higher profitability than domestic banks (Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2007). 
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information about the quality of the firm, but can provide soft information (Berger and 
others, 2001).6 
 
Besides having a disadvantage in using soft information, foreign banks, and in particular 
greenfield institutions, might be less willing to dso. This idea is modeled by Stein (2002) 
and introduced into the banking literature by Berger and others (2005). Stein (2002) argues 
that organizations with more hierarchical structures are more likely to rely on hard 
information as opposed to organizations with flatter structures. The reason is that flatter 
organizations have better control and information on their managers, and thus can afford to 
give them more discretion, which allows them to use soft information. The modeling in Stein 
(2002) and Berger and others (2005) can be easily applied to foreign entrants, which are 
usually part of large multinational banking groups, and where communication of soft 
information is obstructed not only by the hierarchy, but also by cultural and linguistic 
barriers. We can also assume that funds are more easily moved to/from greenfield institutions 
than to/from takeover banks that have large deposit networks and are thus more independent 
in their financing. This would additionally diminish the incentives of managers of greenfield 
institutions to invest time in gathering soft information and engaging in relationship lending.7  
 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) also demonstrate thimpacts on loan rates when foreign 
entrants compete with better informed domestic banks. They show that loan rates charged to 
transparent borrowers are lower than those charged to opaque clients, and this is due to 
differences in the borrowers’ elasticity of demand for credit. Transparent borrowers have a 
more elastic demand because they can signal their info mation to outside lenders, which 
leads to higher competition and, thus, lower cost of funds for large transparent firms. Opaque 
firms, on the other hand, cannot signal their worth and are captured by their creditors leading 
to higher borrowing costs for them. 
 
The above two results—the fact that foreign banks would prefer to lend to more transparent 
borrowers and that lending rates for this type of client are lower—could explain the negative 
                                                
6 Hard and soft information differ in their degree of transferability. Hard information refers to credible and 
publicly verifiable data, such as firms’ balance shets, credit history, collateral and guarantees. Soft inf rmation 
cannot be verified by a third person and is gained a result of the relationship between a bank and a borrower. 
For example, through repeated interviews with an ower of a young firm, a bank manager might be convinced 
that the firm’s owner is a smart, honest and hard working entrepreneur with a high probability of success. 
However, this soft information cannot be transferred to other potential lenders (Petersen, 2004). 
7 New studies question the argument that large and foreign banks are not capable to lend to SMEs (Berger and 
Udell, 2006; de la Torre and others, 2008). The reasoning is that latest advances in credit scoring methodologies 
coupled with enhanced computer power and increased data availability make transaction lending technologies 
to be well suited for funding small firms (Mester, 1997; Petersen and Rajan, 2002). This is especially true when 
credit scores are based on the owner’s personal consumer data obtained from consumer credit bureaus, which is 
combined with data on the SME collected by the financi l institutions. These studies still agree that small 
domestic banks have an advantage to gather and process soft information, but they argue that large and foreign 
banks are also able to lend to SMEs, but using “hard” information-based technologies. In this case, we should 
not observe differences in portfolio allocations of loans between different types of banks. 
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impact of foreign bank ownership on lending rates. Claeys and Hainz (2007) model the 
impact of different modes of foreign bank entry when competing with domestic banks. 
Greenfield and takeover banks both enjoy superior screening technology whereas only 
takeover banks enjoy access to soft information. Domestic banks then have to shade their 
bids more when competing with takeover banks than with greenfield banks. Their model then 
predicts that greenfield banks charge lower loan rates than takeover banks for opaque 
borrowers. Further, greenfield banks will aim to shy away from opaque borrowers for whom 
soft information is important.   
 
Foreign entry could also impact loan maturity and currency composition. Foreign banks 
might bring in hot money, which can be easily withdrawn in case of crisis (Rodrik and 
Velasco, 1999). Foreign banks may also use shorter l an maturities to mitigate borrower risk 
and asymmetric information (Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2008). The theoretical impact of loan 
maturity on cost of credit is ambiguous as it reflects two opposite effects. A borrower that 
issues short-term debt can face costly liquidations at expiration which motivates it to opt for 
longer-term debt. At the same time, lenders prefer to give short term loans because of agency 
problems, such as asset substitution and underinvestment. As a result, borrowers are willing 
to incur and lenders demand higher lending rates for loans with longer maturity. 
Alternatively, lenders might ration credit to risky borrowers and force them to take short-
term loans, which would decrease average lending rates on long-term loans. Empirical 
evidence supports both hypotheses for corporate loans and bonds (Gottesman and Roberts, 
2004; Helwege and Turner, 1999). For an individual firm, the spread typically increases with 
maturity, reflecting greater uncertainty. At the same time, safer firms tend to issue longer-
dated bonds or have access to long-term bank credit, wh ch causes the average spread to 
decline with maturity.8  
 
The currency composition of loan portfolios can also be influenced by the entry of foreign 
banks (Sorsa and others, 2007), because ability and willingness of banks to supply loans in 
foreign currency depends primarily on their access to foreign funds and/or on hedging 
opportunities.9 In this respect, foreign banks have an advantage over domestically-owned 
banks, since they enjoy better access to internatiol capital markets, including their own 
                                                
8 The situation in our data set (i.e., Poland) is additionally complicated because yield curves were downward-
sloping till 2003, reflecting market expectations of diminishing inflation and interest rated convergenc  to the 
EU level. Short-term interest rates declined dramatically from 20.6% at the end of 1996 till 5.7% in 2003, with 
a yield curve taking an upward shape after 2003. In such economic environment, firms would agree to take 
long-term loans only if they had lower interest rate than short-term ones. It should be noted that this situation 
was not unique and is still observed in some CEECs. 
9 Very often loans that are contracted in foreign currency are actually extended to borrowers in domestic 
currency, even though they have all the characteristics of foreign currency loans, namely interest rate nd 
exchange rate risks. In this case banks are not obliged to have access to foreign currency funding, but rather 
they should be able to hedge their exposure to foreign currency risk, which is easiest for banks with good 
standing on international financial markets. 
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parent banks.10 Currency composition may also be an important determinant of lending rates. 
In fact the popularity of loans denominated in foreign currencies stems from lower lending 
rates that are charged on this type of loans. Brown and others (2008) for example show that 
opaque firms have an additional incentive to declar that their revenues are in foreign 
currency in order to profit from cheaper cost of credit. This interest rate advantage can be 
considered as a compensation for the inherent foreign xchange risk. For instance, Beer and 
others (2008) find that more risk-loving households are more likely to take a loan in a foreign 
currency. However, a survey undertaken in 11 CEECs shows that most borrowers, 
particularly households and SMEs, are not aware of involved currency risk (ECB, 2006). 
This is due to historically low exchange rate volatility in some countries, which created a 
belief in low foreign exchange rate risk. The willingness to borrow in foreign currency is 
additionally enhanced by appreciation of the local currency, which is also true for Poland. 
  
To sum up, we expect that loan maturity and currency could be substantially different across 
banks with different ownership and could play an important role in explaining lending costs. 
Since foreign banks are more likely to lend short te m and in foreign currency, we will also 
have to control for these portfolio characteristics n order to distinguish between the 
performance and portfolio composition hypotheses. 
 
B.   Empirical literature 
The empirical evidence on foreign-owned banks and SME credit availability in developing 
countries is rather inconclusive. Studies that focus on foreign bank entry and lending to 
SMEs in CEECs do not provide direct evidence of whether foreign banks’ lending is biased 
towards large transparent borrowers. De Haas and Naaborg (2006) conduct focused 
interviews with managers of foreign parent banks and their affiliates in Central and Eastern 
Europe and document that foreign banks expanded into SME and retail markets. Giannetti 
and Ongena (2009) use firm level data and find thatforeign bank presence in Central and 
Eastern Europe stimulates growth of financial loans, and even though large firms benefit 
more from foreign lending, smaller companies profit as well. But it is not clear whether loans 
to SMEs are supplied by foreign banks or whether domestic institutions decided to expand to 
this sector because of increased competition in the market for transparent borrowers.  
 
Many empirical studies on foreign bank entry focus on Latin American countries. Berger and 
others (2001) find that foreign-owned institutions have difficulties extending loans to opaque 
small firms in Argentina, particularly when foreign banks come from far-away countries. 
Interestingly, banks that are headquartered in other Latin American countries do not differ in 
their lending practices from domestic banks. Clarke and others (2006) find that foreign banks 
                                                
10 To illustrate this point in our sample, the share of interbank liabilities of greenfield banks from nonresident 
banks has increased from 7 to 20 percent of total banks’ assets, reflecting an increasing attractiveness of Poland 
for foreign investors. At the same time, the share of nonresident interbank liabilities of domestic banks, both 
private and state-owned, was virtually zero. 
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in Chile and Peru lend less to SMEs than domestic private banks, whereas the difference is 
not significant in Argentina and Colombia. They also find that large foreign banks increase 
their lending to SMEs faster than domestic banks.  
 
Studies that focus on Asian markets come up with even more pessimistic conclusions. Mian 
(2006) finds that greater cultural and geographical distance between foreign banks’ 
headquarters and local branches in Pakistan leads them to avoid lending to “informationally 
difficult” but sound firms that require relationship lending. Gormley (2007b) finds that only 
profitable firms benefit from foreign bank entry in I dia, whereas there is a significant drop 
in loans to informationally opaque firms.  
 
Unlike above country studies, Clarke and others (2006) rely on a firm survey conducted in 35 
developing and transition economies. They conclude that SMEs benefited from foreign bank 
entry in the form of lower financing obstacles. However, they cannot determine whether this 
improvement came thanks to more lending by foreign institutions, or whether domestic banks 
increased their lending to SMEs because of the increased competition on the market for large 
transparent borrowers. Moreover, their study suffers rom the lack of time series dimension, 
which does not allow them to analyze the observed impact over time. Giannetti and Ongena 
(2008) find for a set of emerging countries that relationships with foreign banks are less 
likely to be terminated. Further they also show that firms benefit indirectly from the presence 
of foreign investors as it increases the probability that firms establish bank relationships, 
improving access to credit for all firms. And Detragiache and others (2008) find for a set of 
89 middle and low income countries that countries with a larger foreign bank presence have 
shallower credit markets and exhibit slower credit growth with a larger initial foreign bank 
presence.  
 
Most of empirical studies for developing and transition countries show that greenfield banks 
charge lower lending rates and spreads than domestic banks and takeover banks. Martinez 
Peria and Mody (2004) study banking markets in fiveLatin American countries during the 
late 1990s and find that foreign banks have lower spreads than domestic banks and takeover 
banks have higher spreads than greenfield banks. Claeys and Hainz (2007) document that 
greenfield banks charge the lowest lending rates in ten CEECs. However, absence of 
sufficiently detailed data does not allow them to discriminate between the two main 
complementary hypotheses we discussed above, i.e., the performance hypothesis and the 








III.  DATA : POLISH BANKING INDUSTRY AND SUMMARY STATISTICS  
 
We test our hypotheses using a unique data set that was kindly provided by the National 
Bank of Poland. It contains quarterly information o 110 Polish banks11 between December 
1996 and December 2006. In addition to standard information from balance sheets and 
income statements (like bank assets, capitalization, c sts and profits), it contains data on 
interest income, amount of granted loans, and nonperforming loans for two borrower types: 
private firms and individual entrepreneurs.12 Our data give us a unique opportunity to 
construct banks’ portfolio shares, interest rates, market shares, concentration measures 
(Herfindahl index), and nonperforming loans for each borrower type separately. 
 
The distinction between the two groups of borrowers mentioned above is grounded in Polish 
law. A borrower is classified as a “private firm” if the firm is owned by private investors 
(either entirely, or where the private share exceeds 50%), and is either subject to commercial 
law or is subject to civil law and employs more than 9 workers. Additionally, such firms have 
to comply with accounting regulations that require full bookkeeping. “Individual 
entrepreneurs (for short, entrepreneurs)”, in contrast, are small firms employing up to 9 
workers, subject to civil law, and using simplified accounting procedures.  
 
In theory, transparent firms have reliable financial st tements, long credit history, and good 
collateral, all of which help the bank to evaluate borrower’s creditworthiness. We are 
confident that private firms in our sample correspond to this definition; hence we label them 
also as transparent borrowers.13 We classify entrepreneurs as opaque because they are small 
and often young entities, and that makes it more challenging for a bank to judge their 
capacity and willingness to repay. This is particularly acute in emerging markets, where 
many small firms are informal. It implies that a firm might have larger turnover and assets 
than it declares officially, but it also implies tha  the firm has unrecorded, contingent senior 
liabilities to its employees (de la Torre and others, 2008).  
 
The Polish banking sector provides a good testing ground for our hypotheses because, similar 
to other CEECs, it experienced massive foreign direct nvestments into the banking sector. At 
the end of 2006, the share of foreign investors in Polish banking constituted 74 percent. This 
is less, however, than in other major CEECs – for example in Hungary more than 80 percent 
of banking assets is in foreign hands, and in the Cz ch Republic and Slovakia foreign banks 
control more than 95 percent of assets. The relativly smaller presence of foreign banks in 
                                                
11 We define a bank as Polish if it is registered in Poland and the National Bank of Poland collects information 
on it.  
12 We have information on three other groups of borrowers, namely state-owned enterprises, individuals, and 
farmers. Due to the difficulties in classifying these borrowers in terms of transparency, we decided to use only 
the two groups mentioned in the text. 
13 Most private firms have considerably more than 9 workers as firms have a tendency to stay either below or go 
far above this cutoff. The average statistics therefore are clearly driven by large firms.  
11 
Poland gives us an additional strong argument to use Poland as a case study, since there are 
still local private and state-owned banks left which serve as a benchmark. 
 
During 1996–2006, there were a number of domestic mergers and acquisitions in the Polish 
banking sector, hence we treat merged institutions as two before the merger and as one 
afterwards14. For our estimations we have deleted the first four quarters of operations for both 
greenfield and takeover banks in order to exclude the initial setting-up and transformation 
period. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 present variable definitions and summary statistics for the variables that we 
employ in our analysis, respectively. Let us look first at the composition of banks’ portfolios. 
As predicted by the portfolio composition theory, foreign banks extend their loans 
predominantly to transparent borrowers: on average, these loans constitute 54 percent of the 
total portfolio. At the same time, domestic banks focus much less on transparent firms—they 
constitute only 31 percent of their portfolio, and the difference between the two is 
statistically significant. The mode of entry plays a very significant role too, as greenfield 
banks extended almost 67% of their loans to private firms, which is 25 percentage points 
more than takeover banks, and twice as much as domestic banks, both private and public. 
Domestic private banks, on the other hand, appear to possess a comparative advantage in 
lending to opaque borrowers i.e., entrepreneurs. Our data show that they devote 15% of their 
portfolio to these borrowers, which is one and a half times more than other banks.  
 
The differences in banks’ portfolios are not constat over 1996–2006. First, it is interesting to 
note that greenfield banks over time start lending more to entrepreneurs, and this stands in 
contrast to the behavior of all other banks. In the same time, they decrease the share of loans 
to private firms in their portfolio. It seems, therefore, that greenfield banks over time acquire 
skills needed for lending based on soft information. Alternatively, we could hypothesize that 
they implement methodologies used for assessment of hard information provided by their 
large clients for the purposes of lending to SMEs, in spirit of Berger and others (2001). 
 
The summary statistics reveal that loan maturity differs according to the mode of foreign 
entry. Greenfield banks issue more and takeover banks less short-term loans than domestic 
private banks (53, 36 and 41 percent, respectively). At the same time, public banks extend 
more long-term loans than any other type of bank, followed by takeover banks. This might be 
explained by less stringent portfolio management techniques and their lower volatility of 
deposits due to implicit government guarantees. It is interesting to see that, contrary to the 
findings for borrower type, the differences between ba ks with respect to loan maturity are 
                                                
14 We also investigated the effect of domestic mergers on banks’ lending rates by including a dummy thatakes 
a value of one if the bank had undergone a domestic merger, and zero otherwise. Our estimations reveald that 
this merger dummy was never statistically significant nd, therefore, we decided to exclude it from our final 
results.  
12 
persistent over our sample period. While all banks eventually start granting more long-term 
loans, the share is still the highest for public banks, while greenfield banks held the highest 
stare of short-term loans. 
 
We now turn to the currency composition of loan portfolios for different types of banks. One 
of the characteristics of many CEECs is the high propo tion of loans in foreign currency. 
Their share ranges from around 10–20 percent in Czech Republic and Slovakia, to 60–
70 percent in the Baltic States. As we see in the data, in 2006 Polish banks extended 
23 percent of their loans in foreign currency, which s not very high in comparison to other 
countries. Still, this poses significant risks for the banking sector, as many borrowers, 
especially the SMEs, are not hedged against currency a d interest rate risk.15 As expected, 
foreign banks, particularly greenfield institutions, give more loans in foreign currency than 
domestic banks, which is probably due to their better access to international capital markets 
and parent companies. These differences are persistent over our sample period. 
 
A comparison of loan rates across all bank types reveals that greenfield banks charge the 
lowest loan rates: 14.7 percent on average for all borrowers, whereas private domestic banks 
charge the highest: 21.7 percent. Takeover banks offer l wer lending rates than both types of 
domestic banks, but charge more than greenfield institutions. These results are in line with 
the existing literature. We also test the differences in rates of greenfield, takeover, and state-
owned banks with respect to rates charged by domestic private banks, and find that all the 
differences are statistically significant.  
 
Next, we compare rates on loans to different types of borrowers. Lending rates offered to 
private firms—the most transparent borrowers—are significantly lower than lending rates 
charged to entrepreneurs. The difference between thm is 2.3 percentage points on average 
and is statistically significant. This is in line with the theoretical considerations that lending 
rates in the competitive markets with the smallest informational asymmetries should be the 
lowest whereas lending rates for opaque borrowers are the highest due to high switching 
costs stemming from informational asymmetries.16   
 
                                                
15 Many foreign currency loans are extended in Swiss Francs, on which lending rates are lower than on Euro 
loans. This characteristic is shared by other countries in CEECs, such as Hungary and Slovenia. This trend 
comes from Austria where most of loans in foreign currency are denominated in Swiss Franc. Originally this
was constrained to regions bordering Switzerland where firms and individuals had a natural hedge against 
currency risk since their income was often in Swiss Franc. However, lending in Swiss Francs is now extended 
to other parts of Austria and to CEECs where Austrian banks are active.  
16 While there was a general trend for all lending rates to decrease over 1996–2006, the spread between lendi g 
rates to private firms and entrepreneurs has not changed in a significant way. Two countervailing forces may 
lead to this finding: opaque borrowers may have become more transparent and foreign banks may have 
increased competition more in the transparent segment of the market. 
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IV.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS—PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION  
 
A.   Empirical Model 
 
We first study the impact of foreign entry and bank ownership on the allocation of loans with 
respect to borrower type, maturity and currency. Wemodel banks’ portfolio shares as a 
function of ownership and mode of entry, as well as controls for bank characteristics, 
macroeconomic environment, and market structure.  
 
To be more formal, we estimate the following model for different types of borrowers, 























          (1) 
 
where itP  is the share of loans: by borrower, by maturity, or by currency in loan portfolio of 
bank i at time t; itOwnership —dummy variables that capture the effect of bank ownership 
(State-owned) and mode of foreign bank entry (Takeover and Greenfield) for bank i at time t; 
itsticscharacteriBank —variables that control for return on assets (ROA), Capitalization, 
Costs, and the share of nonperforming loans (NPL) in the portfolio of bank i at t; tMacro —
variables that control for Inflation, real short-term interest rate (Real interest rate) and real 
GDP growth (GDP) at t; itStructureMarket —variables that control for bank size (Bank 
size) at time t. We lag all explanatory variables by one period an lso include seasonal 
dummies. 
Following Berger and others (1998) and Clarke and others (2006) we estimate all share 
equations in log-odds logit form which allows us to get around the problem that shares by 
definition are bounded between 0 and 1. Since our data set is in panel version, initially we 
have to choose between panel and pooled estimation methods. The former, however, presents 
significant problems: while the Hausman tests indicates that we should allow for unobserved 
fixed effects in the error term, fixed effects estimation does not allow us to estimate the time-
invariant coefficients (i.e., effect of greenfield ownership).17 Random effects estimation 
however will produce inconsistent parameter estimates. Consequently, we opt for a pooled 
model with clustered error terms. We also check the robustness of our results by estimating 
our regressions using Beck and Katz (1995) panel-corre ted standard errors methodology, 
                                                
17 We also check the robustness of results by applying the fixed effect vector decomposition procedure using 
three stage fixed effects methodology of Pluemper and Troeger (2007) and our coefficients of interest r main 
robust. 
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allowing for heterogeneity and autoregressive process of order 1 in the standard errors. Our 
results reported below are robust to this procedure and are available upon request.18 
 
Our main variables of interest are three dummy variables that correspond to types of 
ownership and modes of entry (state-owned, greenfield, takeover), while private domestic 
banks serve the role of benchmark for our estimation. We also split these dummy variables 
for two periods—before and after 2001—to capture changes in lending over time. As the 
choice of this threshold might appear arbitrary, we ch ck the robustness of our results with 
other thresholds, but our findings remain unchanged. We believe that time period in which 
foreign banks operates is more important than banks’ age. For example, a foreign bank that 
enters Poland in the later period is likely to have lr ady been present in other Central and 
Eastern European countries, and therefore has at that time already a lot of experience in 
operating in a transition economy. In fact, we noticed that banks that were the first ones to 
enter Polish banking markets in the early 90s are also those that lend most to large firms, 
which reflects the fact that they came to Poland following their clients and were not 
interested in the local market.   
 
As bank-level characteristics, we include ROA, Capitalization, Costs, Bank size and NPL 
(nonperforming loans) to capture the financial health nd performance of banks, which might 
be correlated with bank strategies. We admit that tese variables might be endogenous, even 
though we have lagged them. To further overcome this potential endogeneity problem we test 
the robustness of our results by including initial s mple values of bank-characteristics, which 
does not change our main results in a significant manner. However, we prefer to present 
results with lagged bank characteristics, because they are time-varying and, thus, serve as 
better controls. It is important to note, though, tat we do not attempt to rely on these 
variables to explain the causal relationship between bank characteristics and loan growth.  
 
The expected signs for these bank controls are unclear because of conflicting hypotheses. 
Healthier banks with higher profits, better loan quality and higher capitalization might be 
able to grow faster over time and to expand to areas where it takes time and effort to acquire 
know-how of the business, like lending to SMEs. Similarly, healthier banks should be able to 
extend more foreign currency loans and loans at longer maturity, because they have better 
access to foreign and long-term funding. On the other hand, banks that suffer from financial 
distress can be required by government supervisors, depositors, and capital market investors 
to reduce their risk profile. This would lead to a decrease in relationship lending to 
informationally opaque small businesses because the risk of these loans cannot be easily 
verified (Berger and others, 2001). Hainz (2005), in contrast, argues that firms can more 
                                                
18 We also test for nonstationarity of the banks’ interest rate data using panel unit root tests of Levin, Lin and 
Chia-Shang (2002), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), Maddal  and Wu (1999) and Hadri (2000). The null 
hypotheses for the first three tests are the existence of the unit root, whereas Hadri (2000) tests the null 
hypotheses of stationarity of time series. We find that all time series in the sample are stationary.  
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easily switch from distressed banks as asymmetric information problems are lowered. 
Similarly, regulators might ask distressed banks to reduce their lending in foreign currency to 
reduce their currency risk. Therefore, we might expect a positive relationship between bank 
health and the share of loans to opaque clients, at longer maturity and in foreign currency. 
 
Contrary to the above hypothesis, failing banks might be more willing to “gamble for 
resurrection” and lend to riskier borrowers, such as SMEs (Clarke and others, 2006). 
Moreover, large firms might be less willing to continue their relationship with such banks, 
whereas opaque clients might have more difficulties switching to other lenders, and 
distressed banks might benefit from their “captured” clients. They might also be more willing 
to lend in foreign currency disregarding currency risk considerations. 
 
It should be mentioned that some of our bank-level ariables, such as ROA, Costs, 
Capitalization, and Bank size, are calculated at the bank level, whereas nonperforming loans 
(NPL) are calculated both at a bank and at a bank-portfoli  level, i.e., separately for 
entrepreneurs and large firms. In the first case, we control for the general health of the bank, 
whereas in the second case we talk about the health of the particular part of a loan portfolio. 
  
To control for macroeconomic environment, we include real short-term interest rate (Real 
interest rate), inflation rate (Inflation) and real GDP growth (GDP). In general, we expect 
that periods of high economic growth with low interest rates and low inflation should be 
more beneficial for riskier and opaque clients, such as small entrepreneurs. Benign economic 
conditions should also increase lending in domestic currency and at longer maturity.  
 
B.   Results for Borrower Type—Portfolio Allocation 
We first estimate the impact of foreign bank ownership on borrower composition of bank 
portfolios (share regressions). The results are report d in Table 3: columns 1–2 present 
findings with the share of private firms in the bank portfolios as dependent variable, and 
columns 3–4 with the share of entrepreneurs. The key explanatory variables in these 
regressions are the greenfield and takeover dummies, which we additionally split for the 
period before and after 2001 to analyze changes over time. Our findings show that, 
controlling for other factors, foreign banks that entered via greenfield investment devote 
almost 25 percent less of their portfolio to entrepreneurs (column 3) while they lend over 
90 percent more to private firms (column 1) than domestic private banks. This result supports 
the portfolio composition theory that points to comparative disadvantages of foreign banks in 
lending to opaque clients. It is interesting to note, however, that the takeover dummy is not 
statistically significant. That can be interpreted as a sign that these disadvantages can be 
overcome by foreign banks if they take over existing i stitutions and thus acquire access to 
local knowledge via local personnel and existing relationships with firms.  
 
To investigate convergence, we split our takeover and greenfield variables separately into 
dummies that take the value of 1 if bank was newly established (for greenfield) or acquired 
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(for takeover) before 2001, and banks that entered (or were acquired) after that date. We do 
find that there is a convergence between banks in terms of portfolio composition as 
differences between greenfield and domestic private b nks diminish after 2001 (columns 2 
and 4). Even though greenfield banks still lend a larger share of their portfolios to private 
firms than domestic private banks, this share is smaller than in the first half of the period in a 
statistically significant manner. At the same time, the difference in terms of loans to 
entrepreneurs between greenfield and domestic private b nks disappears after 2001. These 
findings reflect growing interest of greenfield banks in lending to SME, which may be 
brought by two main developments: 1) fierce competition in the credit market for large 
corporations and 2) improved ability of foreign banks’ subsidiaries to finance relatively 
opaque SMEs (De Haas and Naaborg, 2006). Even though greenfield banks were still less 
able and less willing to engage in relationship lending, they developed other technologies that 
helped them to overcome opaqueness of entrepreneurs, such as small business credit scoring, 
asset-based lending, or fixed assets lending. They were able to do this in the later period, as 
legal and accounting systems have become more sophisticated, making some SMEs more 
transparent.  
 
Our summary statistics suggested that takeover and state-owned banks also devote a smaller 
share of their portfolios to entrepreneurs than domestic private banks; however this result 
disappears in regressions when taking into account r control variables. This stems from the 
fact that these banks are usually large institutions, a d their inability to lend to opaque clients 
is captured by the size variable. Our estimation results clearly show that larger banks prefer 
to lend more to private firms, whereas small banks are better at lending to entrepreneurs. As 
to other bank-specific variables, we find that a bank decreases the share of loans to a specific 
borrower type if the nonperforming loans (NPL) in its loan portfolio for that borrower type 
increase.   
 
C.   Results for Loans at Different Maturities—Portfolio Allocation 
The results of share regressions for loan portfolios at different maturities are reported in 
Table 4. We find that, controlling for other factors, greenfield banks lend more at short-term 
(up to 1 year), and less at long-term (over 5 years) than domestic private banks. The numbers 
are economically significant too, as the greenfield banks have over 73 percent more of short-
term, and over 26 percent less of long-term loans in their portfolios than domestic private 
banks. These results are stable over time, and we do not observe substantial convergence in 
terms of portfolio maturity between banks. Even though the coefficients in the second half of 
the period appear to be smaller for short-term loans d larger for long-term loans, these 
differences are not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that only foreign banks that 
enter via greenfield investment prefer to lend short term, as there are no differences between 
takeover and domestic private banks (the base case). 
 
Our results also show that low inflation and low real interest rates contribute to higher share 
of long-term loans, which is explained by higher cetainty of business conditions and better 
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possibilities of long-term planning, and higher precision of forecasting. We also find that 
healthier banks (measured by higher profits, smaller nonperforming loans, and higher 
capitalization) lend less short-term and more long-term.  
 
D.   Results for Loans in Foreign Currency—Portfolio Allocation 
Table 5 reports the results of our portfolio share regressions for loans in foreign currency. We 
find that greenfield banks offer a higher share of loans in foreign currency. This result holds 
for the entire analyzed period—the difference in coefficients for greenfield banks before and 
after 2001 is not statistically significant (model 2).  
 
The higher share of foreign currency loans granted by greenfield banks might reflect their 
better access to international capital markets either directly or via their parent banks. We are 
able to test this hypothesis by including the share of interbank liabilities with nonresident 
banks to capture foreign funding (model 3).19 This additional explanatory variable turns out 
to be significant and has a positive sign, indicating that banks that have higher share of their 
funding from nonresident banks are more likely to give loans in foreign currency as well. 
However, the inclusion of this variable does not change by a lot the magnitude of coefficient 
of greenfield dummy. Therefore, higher propensity of greenfield banks to extend loans in 
foreign currency stems not only from their better access to international capital markets, but 
also other factors, such as currency risk management, or the servicing of different segments 
of customers.  
 
Among other variables, bank size appears to be significa t in the share regressions, which 
might indicate that larger banks have on average bett r access to foreign currency liabilities, 
which they lend on to borrowers. The decrease in the inflation and interest rates made 
lending in foreign currency less attractive for borrowers, diminishing the growth in these 
loans on average. 
 
To summarize the results obtained up to this point, we found that foreign banks that enter via 
greenfield investment lend more to transparent firms (private firms) and less to opaque firms 
(entrepreneurs), they extend more loans at short-term, and in foreign currency. We also found 
that there is some convergence between banks in terms of portfolio composition as over time 
greenfield banks lend more to opaque and less to transparent borrowers. It is interesting to 
note, however, that there is not much convergence with respect to currency and maturity of 
loans between foreign and domestic banks. We find that greenfield banks lend more short-
term and more in foreign currency than domestic private banks, and these differences are not 
disappearing over time.  
 
                                                
19 We can test this hypothesis only for a limited time period, as the data on interbank liabilities is reported only 
after 2001. We do not present these results in the pap r, but they are available upon request.  
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V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS—LOAN RATES 
 
A.   Empirical Model 
Next, we look at the determinants of bank lending rates. In particular, we investigate whether 
there are differences between interest rates charged by banks with different ownership 
structure after we control for the portfolio compositi n. Section 4 has clearly shown that the 
portfolio composition is different across bank types. To identify the importance of portfolio 
composition, we first estimate a baseline lending rate model with specification similar to 
other studies. We do that to be able to compare our results with the existing literature 
(Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004; Claeys and Hainz, 2007). In this specification, we use 
lending rate for all borrowers as a dependent variable and examine the effect of bank 
ownership and mode of entry on costs of loans for an average borrower, controlling for bank 
characteristics, macroeconomic environment and market structure.  
 












−−−            (2) 
where the variables are as defined before (see Table 1 and 2) except for itL , the lending rate 
of bank i during quarter t, and itStructureMarket , which includes variables that control for 
market concentration and market power (Herfindahl Index and Market Share).  
 
B.   Results for the Average Bank Lending Rate 
The results of estimating model (2) where we do not dis inguish between the different 
borrower types are presented in the first column of Table 6. We find that greenfield banks 
charge their borrowers 0.9 percent less per quarter (or 3.6 percent on an annual basis), 
whereas takeover banks do not charge less than domestic banks, which are omitted in our 
estimations and, thus, serve as a benchmark. Among ba k specific variables, the deviation 
from the median nonperforming loans, costs, and market share are significant and have the 
expected signs. Banks that have higher costs and face higher credit risk are more likely to 
charge higher lending rates. Large banks appear to reap economies of scale which they 
transfer to their customers in the form of lower lending rates.  
 
In line with the literature that analyzes whether bnefits of foreign ownership are constant 
over time, we split our takeover and greenfield variables separately into dummies that take 
the value of 1 if a bank was established (for greenfi ld) or acquired (for takeover) before 
2001 and after that date (in line with our share regressions). Our findings (column 2) show 
that the impact of greenfield mode of foreign entry disappears with time, which is usually 
interpreted in the literature as convergence between banks of different types of ownership 
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due to competition or changes in portfolio compositi n. Our results corroborate previous 
finding in the literature and therefore, our data reflect the situation in developing and 
transition countries and does not just deal with a particular Polish case (Martinez Peria and 
Mody, 2004; Claeys and Hainz, 2007). As a robustnes check, for all interest rate regressions 
we also split the greenfield and takeover variables into dummies that take the value of 1 if a 
bank was established (for greenfield) or acquired (for takeover) less than three years ago and 
banks that were over three years old. We repeated all estimations. The results are robust to 
this, and are available upon request.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the disadvantage of the above model is the lack of information on 
borrower type, which does not allow us to separate the reasons for lower lending rates of 
greenfield banks, i.e., their superior performance or their portfolio composition targeted to 
more transparent borrowers. Our first step to remedy this is to include the share of 
transparent and opaque borrowers in banks’ portfolio into our baseline regression. The 
results, presented in column 3 of Table 6, clearly show that the impact of bank ownership and 
foreign banks’ mode of entry disappears: average lending rates between banks are no longer 
statistically different. It seems, therefore, that the previous findings suffered from the omitted 
variable bias, which rendered some of the ownership variables significant.20 Our results also 
hold if we account for the dynamic effects (column 4): we no longer see any evidence of 
convergence in foreign bank’s interest rates. Consequently, our findings present us with an 
initial proof of the portfolio composition hypothesis. 
 
C.   Results for Borrower Types—Lending Rate 
To further test the portfolio composition hypothesis, we estimate model (2) separately for 
private firms and entrepreneurs. Since we estimate our models with homogeneous borrowers 
in each sample, the composition effect is removed from our estimations and we succeed to 
observe the pure effect of bank ownership and mode of entry on lending rates. As a result, 
any remaining differences between banks with respect to ownership would serve as evidence 
for our performance hypothesis. If we do not find such differences, this will be a proof for 
the portfolio composition hypothesis. 
 
We present our results for transparent borrowers—private firms—in Table 7a, and for 
opaque ones—entrepreneurs—in Table 7b. Our results (column 1 in both tables) show that, 
once we control for the portfolio composition effect, the mode of entry of foreign banks is 
not an important determinant of lending rates. This means that the mode of foreign bank 
ownership has no impact on lending rates, which contradicts the existing literature on the 
                                                
20 Our dataset does not include information on the provision of collateral. We believe that this only would 
reinforce our conclusions regarding the performance hypothesis as theory suggests that foreign banks are more 
likely to demand for collateral (Sengupta (2007)). For example, if we found that foreign banks charge lower 
lending rates, the explanation could related either o higher cost-efficiency or to differences in collateral. But 
since we find no impact, we can more safely reject the performance hypothesis. 
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impact of the mode of foreign bank entry on bank lending rates (Martinez Peria and Mody, 
2004; Claeys and Hainz, 2007; de Haas and Lelyveld, 2006). Our different results stem from 
the fact that previous studies were not able to control for portfolio composition of banks’ 
loan portfolios.  
 
As mentioned above, currency and maturity may also have important impact on interest rates 
charged by banks. To control for currency denominatio  of loans, we augment our model 
with a variable that controls for the share of loans i  foreign currency in banks’ portfolios 
(column 2 in Tables 7a and 7b). As expected, higher s a e of foreign currency loans has a 
negative impact on average lending rates. However, this fact has only a slight impact on our 
final results. We still find that foreign bank ownership and mode of entry do not influence 
lending rates. However, our results indicate that st te-owned banks offer lower lending rates 
once we control for loan currency. Annualized, the difference amounts to 2.8 percent, and is 
both statistically and economically significant. Asshown in the descriptive statistics, state-
owned banks extend more loans in domestic currency than foreign banks. Since these loans 
are on average more expensive than foreign currency loans, the failure to control for this 
factor makes loans extended by state-owned banks appear to be more expensive as well.  
 
To control for loan maturity we augment our model with variables that capture the share of 
short-term and long-term loans in banks’ portfolios (Tables 7a and 7b, column 3). Our results 
show that maturity is not a significant determinant of lending rates, which is probably due to 
a complexity of various factors that play in different directions.  More importantly however, 
when we look at the impact of foreign bank ownership and the mode of entry on lending 
rates after controlling for loan maturity, our result  are robust. It is also the case if we control 
for both currency and maturity simultaneously (Tables 7a and 7b, column 4). 
 
D.   Does Time Influence Lending Rates? 
Even though we do not find an impact of foreign bank ownership and mode of entry on 
banks’ lending rates, we would like to analyze whether it is temporary and maybe banks with 
longer presence in the market are more able to capitalize on their advantages. To do this, we 
again split our takeover and greenfield variables separately into dummies that take the value 
of 1 if bank was newly established (for greenfield) or acquired (for takeover) before 2001, 
and banks that entered (or were acquired) after that date. The results are presented in Tables 
8a and 8b for transparent and opaque borrowers, respectively. 
 
Our findings suggest that time does not play an important role and even after many years of 
operations lending rates of foreign banks are not different from those of domestic private 
banks. Our results are very robust to different specifications of variables accounting for time 
dynamics. To check the stability of our results we us  different year in which we split the 
sample, we use bank age (as mentioned above) or we use interaction variable between age 
and time and foreign bank dummies assuming a linear r l tionship. Our results remain the 
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same and we do not find any age or time dynamic effects. These results are not reported in 
the paper for brevity, but are available upon request. 
 
Our results are contrary to the existing literature, which shows that lending rates of greenfield 
banks are lower on average but converge with lending rates of other banks in the longer term. 
We argue that previous findings are due to changing portfolio composition of foreign banks, 
and not due to convergence in performance. If we look at the descriptive statistics in Section 
3, we observe that greenfield banks decreased the shar  of their loans to large private firms, 
and more recently, they started to extend less loans in foreign currency. Both of these factors 
should contribute to an increase of average lending rates of greenfield banks over the 
analyzed period, but this is purely a portfolio composition effect.  
 
VI.  FINDINGS FOR DOMESTIC BANKS 
 
From the perspective of public policy, it is not important if foreign banks prefer to target 
more transparent clients as long as domestic banks continue to lend to SMEs (Detragiache 
and others, 2008). However, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) predict that domestic banks 
increase the share of opaque clients in the wake of foreign bank entry, but this brings about 
the deterioration in their overall portfolio quality. To test these hypotheses, we analyze the 
impact of foreign bank entry on the supply of loans d portfolio quality of domestic banks. 
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where in all regressions Share greenfieldt is the share of greenfield and Share takeovert  is the 
share of takeover banks in the total banking loans at quarter t, and NPLt is the measure for 
nonperforming loans, and the other variables are as defined above.  
 
We have seen so far that foreign banks that enter via greenfield investment lend more to large 
firms and less to entrepreneurs, they extend more lans at short-term, and in foreign 
currency. However, the entry of foreign banks might influence the supply of loans not only 
directly via lending by these banks, but also indirectly by influencing the behavior of 
domestic institutions. For example, higher competition in the market for transparent 
borrowers might induce domestic banks to lend more t  opaque clients. At the same time, if 
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greenfield banks cherry pick the best borrowers, the quality of loan portfolios of domestic 
banks could deteriorate. To test these hypotheses we include the share of loans granted by 
greenfield and takeover banks into the share and noperforming loans regressions, and run 
them on the sample of domestic banks.  
 
The results presented in Table 9 show that domestic banks increased the share of 
entrepreneurs in their portfolios in the wake of foreign bank entry. Even though this impact is 
only significant in the period after 2001 and for the share of loans granted by greenfield 
banks, it is consistent with theoretical predictions of Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004). As a 
result of greenfield entry, domestic banks appear to efocus their lending more towards 
opaque clients for whom they have the largest comparative advantages.  
 
In Table 10, we show the impact of foreign bank entry on the level of nonperforming loans of 
domestic banks. Our results show that foreign banks have an opposite effect on the quality of 
loan portfolios of domestic banks depending on their mode of entry. The entry of greenfield 
banks decreased the quality of loan portfolios of dmestic banks to both transparent and 
opaque clients. This is consistent with the hypothesis that greenfield banks attract the best 
clients forcing domestic banks to lend to higher risk borrowers, which were likely to be 
turned down by foreign lenders who possess superior screening techniques (Claeys and 
Hainz, 2007). Among entrepreneurs, greenfield banks might have attracted the relatively 
more transparent borrowers to whom they could lend relying on transaction-based lending 
techniques. This deteriorating portfolio quality of domestic banks in the wake of foreign bank 
entry via greenfield investment is consistent with predictions of Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 
(2004). 
 
At the same time, the entry of takeover banks appears to decrease the amount of 
nonperforming loans of domestic banks. This could be attributed to positive spillovers with 
respect to lending techniques, loan monitoring or risk management. The fact that the 
observed improvement concerns only loans to private firms suggests that domestic banks 
lending to entrepreneurs might rely mostly on relationship lending.  
 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Using a unique novel data set providing us with detail d information on bank portfolios, we 
explore how foreign bank entry determines credit alloc tion in emerging markets. In 
particular, we investigate the impact of the mode of f reign entry—greenfield and 
takeover—on banks’ portfolio allocation to borrowers with different degrees of informational 
transparency, as well as by maturities and currencies. The impact of foreign entry on credit 
allocation may stem from the superior performance of foreign entrants (“performance 
hypothesis”), or reflect borrower informational capture (“portfolio composition hypothesis”). 
Our results are broadly in line with the theoretical models underpinning the portfolio 
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composition hypothesis, showing that informational capture determines bank credit 
allocation (see e.g., Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004, or Sengupta, 2007).   
 
Our main result can be further summarized as follows. First, we show that the mode of entry 
is a very important determinant of foreign banks’ portfolio composition. Greenfield banks 
devote a higher share of their portfolio to transparent firms and a smaller one to opaque firms 
than domestic banks, whereas there are no large diff rences between takeover banks and 
domestic private banks. We further find that over time greenfield banks shifted away from 
transparent borrowers towards more opaque ones. Thi is consistent with theories arguing 
that greenfield banks have comparative advantages at l nding to transparent borrowers using 
hard information initially, but over time also become privately informed and start servicing 
opaque borrowers based on soft information.  
 
Second, we argue that the result established in the existing literature indicating that the 
average lending rate of greenfield banks is lower than that of domestic private banks has to 
be attributed to a different portfolio composition: greenfield banks offer more loans to 
transparent borrowers that exhibit a lower cost of credit. When the interest rates offered to 
different borrower types are analyzed, the effect of foreign ownership disappears.  
 
Third, our results reveal that greenfield banks extend more loans in foreign currency. This 
reflects their better access to foreign currency funding in international capital markets either 
directly or via their parent companies, and the fact that they lend more to multinational 
corporations and exporting firms. Moreover, greenfild banks extend more loans at shorter 
maturities and less loans at longer maturities, which may reflect their short-term commitment 
to host economies. Furthermore, we find very little evidence of convergence between 
greenfield and private banks in terms of loan maturity and currency. The composition of 
portfolios has remained the same during the analyzed p riod and greenfield banks 
consistently lend more at shorter maturities and in foreign currency.  
 
Finally, higher participation of greenfield banks had negative impacts on the loan portfolio 
quality of domestic banks. Interestingly, the entry of takeover banks had no impact on the 
loan portfolio of domestic banks for opaque firms, but improved the loan portfolio quality of 
transparent firms. This suggests spillover effects as domestic institutions learn to use 
transaction-based lending techniques in lending to transparent borrowers. 
 
Our findings have important policy implications in l ght of the current crisis. On the one 
hand, the fact that foreign banks have more foreign currency loans in their portfolios renders 
them more vulnerable to credit risk. As local currenci s have depreciated in many emerging 
economies, it becomes more difficult for borrowers – that do not receive their income in 
foreign currency – to service their loans. On the other hand, shorter loan maturity of foreign 
banks’ portfolios allows them to diminish credit supply by not extending new loans, which 
could protect their balances sheets but would impose credit constraints on borrowers. 
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Table 1. Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition 
State-owned A dummy variable which takes the value of one if more than 50 percent of 
the bank is owned by the state, zero otherwise 
Takeover A dummy variable which takes the value of one if more than 50 percent of 
the bank is owned by the foreign investor, which entered the market via 
acquisition of an existing bank, zero otherwise 
Greenfield A dummy variable which takes the value of one if more than 50 percent of 
the bank is owned by the foreign investor, which entered the market via 
establishing a new bank, zero otherwise 
Lending rate The ratio of interest income to total loans. This variable is calculated for 
all borrowers, and for private firms and entrepreneurs separately. 
Calculated quarterly, unless explicitly stated otherwise  
NPL The ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. This variable is calculated 
for all borrowers and for private firms and entrepreneurs separately. 
Market share Share of loans of a bank in the total loans of banking sector in host 
country. This variable is calculated for all borrowers, and for private firms 
and entrepreneurs separately. 
Capitalization The ratio of risk adjusted capital 
Cost The ratio of personnel and administrative costs to total assets 
Herfindahl index Herfindahl index, calculated as the sum of squared shares of loans. This 




The ratio of loans to private firms (entrepreneurs) in bank’s portfolio. 
Share greenfield 
(takeover) 
The ratio of loans granted by greenfield (takeover) banks to total loans 
granted by all banks in quarter t 
FX loans The ratio of loans in foreign currency in bank’s loan portfolio. This variable 
is calculated for all borrowers, and for private firms and entrepreneurs 
separately. 
Short-term loans The ratio of loans with maturity less than 1 year in a bank’s loan portfolio. 
This variable is calculated for all borrowers, and for private firms and 
entrepreneurs separately. 
Long-term loans The ratio of loans with maturity over 5 years in a bank’s loan portfolio. 
This variable is calculated for all borrowers, and for private corporations 
and entrepreneurs separately. 
GDP  Real quarterly growth rate of GDP 
Inflation Quarterly inflation rate 
Real interest rate Real short-term interest rate, calculated using 3 month WIBOR (Warsaw 
interbank offered rate) interest rate and inflation rate by Fisher equation  
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.  A B 
Share of loans to private firms in portfolios of      
greenfield  750 0.667 0.348 *** *** 
takeover 738 0.404 0.263 ***  
private 563 0.329 0.225   
state-owned 330 0.292 0.166 ***  
Share of loans to entrepreneurs in portfolios of      
greenfield  750 0.082 0.141 *** *** 
takeover 738 0.098 0.082 ***  
private 563 0.151 0.120   
state-owned 330 0.103 0.099 ***  
Share of loans up to 1 year in portfolios of      
greenfield  750 0.537 0.327 *** *** 
takeover 738 0.358 0.178 ***  
private 563 0.411 0.214   
state-owned 330 0.296 0.169 ***  
Share of loans from 1 to 5 yrs in portfolios of      
greenfield  750 0.306 0.283 *** *** 
takeover 738 0.381 0.177   
private 563 0.374 0.177   
state-owned 330 0.350 0.204 *  
Share of loans over 5 yrs in portfolios of      
greenfield  750 0.157 0.179 *** *** 
takeover 738 0.261 0.194 ***  
private 563 0.215 0.203   
state-owned 330 0.353 0.267 ***  
Share of loans in foreign currency in portfolios of      
greenfield  750 0.302 0.235 *** *** 
takeover 738 0.216 0.208 ***  
private 563 0.107 0.161   
state-owned   330 0.108 0.127 *  
Lending rate 2073 0.174 0.126   
Lending rates on loans issued by      
greenfield 632 0.147 0.089 ***  
takeover 605 0.165 0.161 ***  
state-owned 307 0.174 0.086 ***  
private 529 0.217 0.126   
Lending rate on loans to private firms 2151 0.167 0.141   
by greenfield 618 0.152 0.138 ***  
by takeover 600 0.155 0.153 ***  
by state-owned 307 0.161 0.085 ***  
by private 524 0.212 0.155   
EntrepLending rate on loans to entrepreneurs 1836 0.190 0.170  *** 
by greenfield 329 0.145 0.199 ***  
by takeover 598 0.173 0.152 ***  
by state-owned 307 0.197 0.197 ***  
by private 523 0.235 0.180   
Nonperforming loans 2151 0.368 1.233   
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Table 2. Summary Statistics (concluded) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.  A B 
Nonperforming loans to private firms by      
greenfield  739 0.078 1.241 *** *** 
takeover 738 0.444 1.466 ***  
private 563 0.808 1.746   
state-owned 330 0.565 1.167 **  
Nonresident interbank liabilities by      
greenfield 375 0.140 0.193 *** *** 
takeover 401 0.054 0.114 ***  
private 117 0.002 0.008   
state-owned 107 0.016 0.032 ***  
ROA 2196 0.001 0.074   
Cost 2284 0.013 0.022   
Capitalization 2284 0.205 0.327   
Herfindahl Index 2270 0.072 0.009   
private firms 2270 0.068 0.009   
entrepreneurs 2270 0.070 0.012  *** 
Market share 2269 0.017 0.031   
GDP growth 2160 0.016 0.086   
Inflation 2160 0.015 0.015   
Real interest rate 2160 0.018 0.013   
***, **, and * correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels that the difference: in column A between 
greenfield, takeover, state-owned and private banks, and in column B between private firms and 
entrepreneurs is different from zero.  
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Table 3. Borrower Type: Share of Loans to Private F irms and Entrepreneurs 








 1 2 3 4 
Greenfield  2.286***  -1.143**  
 [0.546]  [0.508]  
Takeover  -0.108  -0.396  
 [0.529]  [0.336]  
State-owned -0.454 -0.492 -0.188 -0.223 
 [0.374] [0.380] [0.335] [0.331] 
Greenfield* before 2001  2.641***  -2.046*** 
  [0.567]  [0.735] 
Greenfield* after 2001  1.906***  -0.756 
  [0.594]  [0.505] 
Takeover* before 2001  0.232  -0.036 
  [0.489]  [0.289] 
Takeover* after 2001  -0.452  -0.589 
  [0.608]  [0.430] 
ROA -21.192*** -20.561*** -0.373 -1.001 
 [6.915] [6.859] [5.578] [5.336] 
Cost  -105.978*** -105.166*** 0.043 0.308 
 [16.64] [16.463] [17.493] [18.484] 
Capitalization 1.666*** 1.644*** -1.651 -1.472 
 [0.349] [0.338] [1.018] [1.013] 
Bank size 0.238** 0.236** -0.255*** -0.229** 
 [0.115] [0.118] [0.095] [0.094] 
NPL -0.237** -0.240** -0.440*** -0.442*** 
 [0.105] [0.102] [0.101] [0.103] 
GDP 1.707 1.353 1.903 2.058 
 [1.496] [1.533] [2.099] [2.107] 
Inflation  29.458*** 16.877** 5.559 7.322 
 [7.144] [6.880] [8.509] [6.540] 
Real interest rate 23.402*** 17.266*** 7.734 9.652 
 [6.612] [6.171] [7.142] [6.408] 
Observations 2133 2133 1802 1802 
Number of banks 107 107 101 101 
R-squared 0.365 0.372 0.199 0.226 
Table 3 presents the results of equation (1). The dependent variable is the log-odds ratio of the share of loans 
to private firms and entrepreneurs in banks’ portfolios. The table lists coefficients and standard errors (in 
parentheses) from regression with pooled OLS with robust standard errors clustered on banks. All dependent 
variables except for ownership dummies are lagged by one quarter. Regressions include seasonal dummies. 
Definitions of variables are provided in Table 1. ***, **, and * correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4. Loan Maturity: Share of Loans by Maturity in Banks’ Portfolios  
 Up 1 year Up 1 year Over 5 years Over 5 years 
 1 2 3 4 
Greenfield  1.030**  -1.043**  
 [0.397]  [0.400]  
Takeover  0.022  -0.721  
 [0.223]  [0.458]  
State-owned -0.729** -0.728** 0.196 0.170 
 [0.335] [0.336] [0.449] [0.447] 
Greenfield* before 2001  1.168***  -1.240** 
  [0.438]  [0.482] 
Greenfield* after 2001  0.924**  -0.964** 
  [0.402]  [0.414] 
Takeover* before 2001  0.003  -0.403 
  [0.257]  [0.368] 
Takeover* after 2001  0.005  -0.921 
  [0.228]  [0.558] 
ROA -6.286** -6.205** -7.517 -7.274 
 [2.525] [2.504] [7.223] [7.037] 
Cost  -15.891 -16.154 -30.477 -28.807 
 [11.495] [11.528] [21.138] [21.657] 
Capitalization 0.061 0.052 1.448** 1.464** 
 [0.275] [0.279] [0.553] [0.579] 
Bank size 0.120* 0.114* 0.441*** 0.457*** 
 [0.067] [0.067] [0.135] [0.141] 
NPL 0.182* 0.180* -0.05 -0.045 
 [0.094] [0.093] [0.101] [0.102] 
GDP 1.73 1.618 -2.596 -2.52 
 [1.299] [1.316] [2.003] [2.043] 
Inflation  29.968*** 27.745*** -13.767* -15.800** 
 [4.393] [4.221] [8.235] [7.097] 
Real interest rate 27.045*** 25.739*** -12.552 -12.778* 
 [4.786] [4.362] [8.087] [7.418] 
Observations 2155 2155 2024 2024 
Number of banks 108 108 108 108 
R-squared 0.213 0.214 0.229 0.235 
Table 4 presents the results of equation (1). The dependent variable is the log-odds ratio of the share of 
loans with maturity up to 1 year (models 1 and 2) and over 5 years (models 3 and 4) in banks’ portfolios. 
The table lists coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from regression with pooled OLS with 
robust standard errors clustered on banks. All dependent variables except for ownership dummies are 
lagged by one quarter. Regressions include seasonal dummies. Definitions of variables are provided in 
Table 1. ***, **, and * correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Foreign Currency: Share of Loan Portfolio in Foreign Currency 
 1 2 3 
Greenfield  1.840***  1.689*** 
 [0.497]  [0.481] 
Takeover  0.354  0.307 
 [0.579]  [0.573] 
State-owned -0.425 -0.413 -0.463 
 [0.512] [0.510] [0.503] 
Greenfield* before 2001  1.997***  
  [0.482]  
Greenfield* after 2001  1.739***  
  [0.558]  
Takeover* before 2001  0.220  
  [0.650]  
Takeover* after 2001  0.410  
  [0.618]  
ROA -13.463 -13.582 -12.168 
 [10.570] [10.575] [10.244] 
Cost  -30.016 -30.901 -25.788 
 [30.239] [29.790] [30.089] 
Capitalization 0.999* 0.987* 1.055* 
 [0.594] [0.585] [0.608] 
Bank size 0.378*** 0.369*** 0.397*** 
 [0.110] [0.109] [0.110] 
NPL -0.121* -0.124* -0.114* 
 [0.068] [0.068] [0.066] 
Interbank liabilities   1.926*** 
   [0.669] 
GDP 0.334 0.144 0.085 
 [1.866] [1.855] [1.875] 
Inflation  9.832 8.933 13.752 
 [9.098] [10.109] [9.492] 
Real interest rate 14.099 13.097 18.912* 
 [10.227] [10.641] [10.726] 
Observations 1662 1662 1662 
Number of banks 92 92 92 
R-squared 0.223 0.225 0.234 
Table 5 presents the results of equation (1). The dependent variable is the log-odds ratio of the share of 
loans in foreign currency in banks’ portfolios. The table lists coefficients and standard errors (in 
parentheses) from regression with pooled OLS (robust standard errors clustered on banks). All 
dependent variables except for ownership dummies are lagged by one quarter. Regressions include 
seasonal dummies. Definitions of variables are provided in Table 1. ***, **, and * correspond to 1%, 5% 




Table 6. Average Bank Lending Rate 
 1 2 3 4 
Greenfield  -0.009**  0.003  
 [0.004  [0.005]  
Takeover  0.002  0.005  
 [0.005]  [0.005]  
State-owned -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Takeover* before 2001  0.001  0.002 
  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Takeover* after 2001  0.004  0.006 
  [0.007]  [0.006] 
Greenfield* before 2001  -0.010**  0.003 
  [0.004]  [0.005] 
Greenfield* after 2001  -0.007  0.003 
  [0.005]  [0.005] 
Share private   -0.036*** -0.036*** 
   [0.012] [0.012] 
Share entrepreneur   -0.011 -0.01 
   [0.009] [0.009] 
Capitalization 0.006 0.006 0.01 0.01 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] 
Cost 0.470*** 0.469*** 0.087 0.085 
 [0.093] [0.093] [0.130] [0.131] 
NPL 0.010** 0.010** 0.011** 0.011** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Market share -0.114** -0.116** -0.106** -0.109** 
 [0.048] [0.052] [0.041] [0.044] 
Herfindahl Index 0.228** 0.189* 0.225** 0.212** 
 [0.087] [0.097] [0.087] [0.092] 
GDP -0.016 -0.013 0.008 0.009 
 [0.016] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] 
Inflation  0.663*** 0.718*** 0.705*** 0.728*** 
 [0.101] [0.092] [0.083] [0.084] 
Real interest rate 0.641*** 0.664*** 0.719*** 0.725*** 
 [0.126] [0.121] [0.098] [0.101] 
Observations 2271 2271 2271 2271 
Number of banks 106 106 106 106 
R-squared 0.323 0.325 0.399 0.399 
Table 6 presents the results of equation (2). The dependent variable is the bank-specific average lending rate. The table 
lists coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from regression with pooled OLS with robust standard errors 
clustered on banks. All dependent variables except for ownership dummies are lagged by one quarter. Regressions 
include seasonal dummies. Definitions of variables are provided in Table 1. ***, **, and * correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 7a. Loan Rates to Private Firms  
 1 2 3 4 
Greenfield  -0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.004 
 [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] 
Takeover  0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 
 [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
State-owned -0.006 -0.007* -0.004 -0.006** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] 
FX loans  -0.036***  -0.035*** 
  [0.006]  [0.006] 
Short-term loans   -0.006 -0.004 
   [0.010] [0.008] 
Long-term loans   -0.017 -0.010 
   [0.012] [0.010] 
Capitalization -0.008** -0.004 -0.006* -0.004 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
Cost  0.454** 0.260* 0.372** 0.240* 
 [0.183] [0.143] [0.158] [0.144] 
NPL 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Market share -0.169*** -0.083*** -0.130*** -0.068** 
 [0.040] [0.023] [0.043] [0.030] 
Herfindahl index 0.287*** 0.258*** 0.254*** 0.251*** 
 [0.095] [0.087] [0.086] [0.086] 
GDP -0.042 -0.034 -0.043 -0.033 
 [0.030] [0.029] [0.030] [0.029] 
Inflation  0.646*** 0.697*** 0.628*** 0.675*** 
 [0.088] [0.072] [0.088] [0.083] 
Real interest rate 0.781*** 0.885*** 0.780*** 0.868*** 
 [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] 
Observations 2239 2233 2233 2233 
Number of banks 104 104 104 104 
R-squared 0.267 0.313 0.284 0.315 
Table 7a presents the results of equation (2). The dependent variable is the bank-specific interest rate on loans to private 
firms (i.e., transparent). The table lists coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from regression with pooled OLS 
with robust standard errors clustered on banks. Herfindahl Index, Market Share, FX loans, Short-term loans and Long-
term loans are calculated for private firms. All dependent variables except for ownership dummies are lagged by one 
quarter. Regressions include seasonal dummies. Definitions of variables are provided in Table 1. ***, **, and * correspond 
to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 7b. Loan Rates to Entrepreneurs 
 1 2 3 4 
Greenfield  -0.005 0.001 -0.004 0.001 
 [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] 
Takeover  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] 
State-owned -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
FX loans  -0.031***  -0.031*** 
  [0.007]  [0.007] 
Short-term loans   0.001 0.001 
   [0.007] [0.007] 
Long-term loans   0.001 0.007 
   [0.017] [0.017] 
Capitalization 0.013 [0.015 0.016 0.015 
 [0.017] 0.018] [0.017] [0.017] 
Cost  0.533 [0.450 0.561 0.459 
 [0.331] 0.329] [0.349] [0.332] 
NPL 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Market share -0.115*** -0.083*** -0.107*** -0.085*** 
 [0.036] [0.026] [0.036] [0.028] 
Herfindahl index 0.137 0.158* 0.162* 0.162* 
 [0.095] [0.095] [0.095] [0.094] 
GDP -0.099** -0.092** -0.103*** -0.092** 
 [0.038] [0.038] [0.039] [0.038] 
Inflation  0.617*** 0.586*** 0.629*** 0.605*** 
 [0.127] [0.123] [0.128] [0.120] 
Real interest rate 0.529*** 0.540*** 0.540*** 0.558*** 
 [0.174] [0.174] [0.172] [0.168] 
Observations 1924 1924 1924 1924 
Number of banks 98 98 98 98 
R-squared 0.189 0.219 0.196 0.219 
Table 7b presents the results of equation (2). The dependent variable is the bank-specific interest rate on loans to 
entrepreneurs (i.e., opaque). The table lists coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from regression with pooled 
OLS with robust standard errors clustered on banks. Herfindahl Index, Market Share, FX loans, Short-term loans and 
Long-term loans are calculated for entrepreneurs. All dependent variables except for ownership dummies are lagged by 
one quarter. Regressions include seasonal dummies. Definitions of variables are provided in Table 1. ***, **, and * 
correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 8a. Loan Rates to Private Firms (with time ef fects) 
 1 2 3 4 
Greenfield* before 2001 -0.001 0.006 -0.002 0.005 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
Greenfield* after 2001 -0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003 
 [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] 
Takeover* before 2001 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.005 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Takeover* after 2001 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.004 
 [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] 
State-owned  -0.006 -0.007* -0.004 -0.007* 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] 
FX loans  -0.036***  -0.035*** 
  [0.006]  [0.006] 
Short-term loans   -0.005 -0.004 
   [0.010] [0.008] 
Long-term loans   -0.017 -0.010 
   [0.013] [0.010] 
Cost 0.453** 0.261* 0.373** 0.241* 
 [0.186] [0.144] [0.160] [0.145] 
Capitalization -0.008** -0.005 -0.006* -0.004 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
NPL 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Market share -0.169*** -0.082*** -0.128*** -0.066** 
 [0.044] [0.025] [0.045] [0.033] 
Herfindahl index 0.279** 0.274** 0.258** 0.276** 
 0.129 0.112 [0.113] [0.111] 
GDP -0.042 -0.034 -0.043 -0.033 
 [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.029] 
Inflation  0.654*** 0.679*** 0.625*** 0.647*** 
 [0.139] [0.115] [0.137] [0.133] 
Real interest rate 0.784*** 0.878*** 0.780*** 0.856*** 
 [0.096] [0.088] [0.102] [0.098] 
Observations 2239 2233 2233 2233 
Number of banks 104 104 104 104 
R-squared 0.267 0.314 0.285 0.315 
Table 8a presents the results of equation (2). The dependent variable is the bank-specific interest rate on loans to private 
firms (i.e., transparent). The table lists coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from regression with pooled OLS 
with robust standard errors clustered on banks. Herfindahl Index, Market Share, FX loans, Short-term loans and Long-
term loans are calculated for private firms. All dependent variables except for ownership dummies are lagged by one 
quarter. Regressions include seasonal dummies. Definitions of variables are provided in Table 1. ***, **, and * correspond 
to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 8b. Loan Rates to Entrepreneurs (with time ef fects) 
 1 2 3 4 
Greenfield* before 2001 -0.006 0.001 -0.006 0.001 
 [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] 
Greenfield* after 2001 -0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.001 
 [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] 
Takeover* before 2001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] 
Takeover* after 2001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
 [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] 
State-owned  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] 
FX loans  -0.031***  -0.031*** 
  [0.007]  [0.007] 
Short-term loans   0.001 0.001 
   [0.007] [0.007] 
Long-term loans   0.001 0.007 
   [0.017] [0.017] 
Cost 0.532 0.449 0.561 0.458 
 [0.333] [0.330] [0.352] [0.333] 
Capitalization 0.013 0.015 0.016 0.015 
 [0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.017] 
NPL 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Market share -0.116*** -0.084*** -0.108*** -0.086*** 
 [0.037] [0.026] [0.037] [0.029] 
Herfindahl index 0.136 0.158* 0.160* 0.161* 
 [0.094] [0.094] [0.094] [0.093] 
GDP -0.097** -0.091** -0.102** -0.091** 
 [0.040] [0.040] [0.041] [0.040] 
Inflation  0.644*** 0.603*** 0.660*** 0.623*** 
 [0.172] [0.166] [0.167] [0.160] 
Real interest rate 0.541*** 0.547*** 0.555*** 0.566*** 
 [0.199] [0.197] [0.195] [0.190] 
Observations 1924 1903 1903 1903 
Number of banks 98 98 98 98 
R-squared 0.189 0.219 0.196 0.219 
Table 8a presents the results of equation (2). The dependent variable is the bank-specific interest rate on loans to 
entrepreneurs (i.e., opaque). The table lists coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from regression with pooled 
OLS with robust standard errors clustered on banks. Herfindahl Index, Market Share, FX loans, Short-term loans and 
Long-term loans are calculated for entrepreneurs. All dependent variables except for ownership dummies are lagged by 
one quarter. Regressions include seasonal dummies. Definitions of variables are provided in Table 1. ***, **, and * 
correspond to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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 1 2 3 4 
State-owned -0.022 -0.017 -0.13 -0.127 
 [0.399] [0.401] [0.349] [0.349] 
Share greenfield (in this 
segment) -1.502  7.787**  
 [4.375]  [3.124]  
Share takeover (in this 
segment) -0.657  -0.378  
 [0.470]  [0.498]  
Share of greenfield* before 
2001  3.475  5.127 
  [5.707]  [5.633] 
Share of greenfield* after 
2001  2.164  13.789*** 
  [5.586]  [4.818] 
Share of takeover* before 
2001  -0.972  -0.329 
  [0.631]  [0.509] 
Share of takeover* after 
2001  -0.136  -1.299 
  [1.108]  [1.344] 
ROA 1.401 1.584 -5.183* -5.381* 
 [3.816] [3.801] [2.913] [2.909] 
Cost  -115.361*** -114.849*** -68.393* -68.657* 
 [31.760] [31.456] [34.312] [34.354] 
Capitalization 0.040 0.006 -1.613** -1.659** 
 [0.636] [0.635] [0.774] [0.758] 
Bank size -0.144 -0.148 -0.260*** -0.264*** 
 [0.118] [0.119] [0.096] [0.097] 
NPL -0.260*** -0.261*** -0.372*** -0.374*** 
 [0.083] [0.082] [0.090] [0.089] 
GDP -0.241 0.255 0.973 -0.099 
 [1.506] [1.949] [1.209] [1.407] 
Inflation  -3.407 2.817 9.807* 8.467 
 [6.503] [7.268] [5.724] [6.747] 
Real interest rate -3.464 -0.204 11.553 12.179* 
 [7.792] [7.442] [7.289] [7.057] 
Observations 775 775 781 781 
Number of banks 54 54 54 54 
R-squared 0.237 0.239 0.361 0.363 
Table 9 presents the results of equation (3).The dependent variable is the log-odds ratio of the share of loans to 
private firms (model 1 and 2) and entrepreneurs (model 3 and 4) in domestic banks’ portfolios. The table lists 
coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from regression with pooled OLS with robust standard errors 
clustered on banks. All dependent variables except for ownership dummy are lagged by one quarter. 
Regressions include seasonal dummies. Definitions of variables are provided in Table 1. ***, **, and * correspond 
to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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 1 2 3 4 
State-owned -0.247 -0.248 -0.127 -0.134 
 [0.278] [0.275] [0.405] [0.400] 
Share greenfield (in this 
segment) 4.875  9.518**  
 [5.135]  [4.368]  
Share takeover (in this 
segment) -0.988*  0.057  
 [0.531]  [0.478]  
Share of greenfield* before 
2001  4.353  7.934 
  [4.588]  [4.826] 
Share of greenfield* after 2001  17.052***  21.349** 
  [6.387]  [10.042] 
Share of takeover* before 2001  -1.007*  -0.024 
  [0.576]  [0.537] 
Share of takeover* after 2001  -2.068**  -1.160 
  [0.874]  [1.079] 
GDP 1.057 0.160 0.583 -0.043 
 [1.133] [0.961] [1.015] [1.068] 
Inflation  -14.256* -13.021* -9.716 -9.250 
 [7.280] [6.786] [8.918] [7.674] 
Real interest rate -14.394 -11.131 -11.404 -8.413 
 [8.917] [7.401] [11.238] [8.524] 
Observations 847 847 847 847 
Number of banks 56 56 56 56 
R-squared 0.030 0.036 0.025 0.031 
Table 10 presents the results of equation (4). The dependent variable is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans for 
private firms (model 1 and 2) and entrepreneurs (model 3 and 4), calculated as a deviation from the median. The table lists 
coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from regression with pooled OLS with robust standard errors clustered on 
banks. All dependent variables except for ownership dummy are lagged by one quarter. Regressions include seasonal 
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